FOI 25-280 NILO Officers
Freedom of Information Request
- Reference
- FOI 25-280 NILO Officers
- Request Date
- 03 Jul 2025
- Response Date
- 11 Jul 2025
- Information Requested
I am currently conducting research into UK ambulance services use of National Interagency Liaison Officers and Communications Tactical Advisors, and kindly request the following information from your service: • How many trained National Interagency Liaison Officers (NILOs) does your trust have? • How many NILOs are on-call/available at any given time? • What is your trusts approach to NILOs within the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) environment? • Has your trust adopted National Control Liaison Officers (NCLOs)? • How many trained Communications Tactical Advisors (CTA) does your trust have? • Do you deploy CTAs to the scene of significant and/or major incidents?
- Response
How many trained National Interagency Liaison Officers (NILOs) does your trust have?
The Scottish Ambulance Service have qualified and in-date NILOs across Scotland.
How many NILOs are on-call/available at any given time?
We can confirm that NILO’s have on-call capability.
What is your trusts approach to NILOs within the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) environment?
NILOs are deployed wherever operationally appropriate.
Has your trust adopted National Control Liaison Officers (NCLOs)?
We have qualified and in-date NCLO personnel.
How many trained Communications Tactical Advisors (CTA) does your trust have?
The Scottish Ambulance Service does not have any Communications Tactical Advisors (CTA’s). There is an equivalent role of Tactical Advisors (TACAD).
Do you deploy CTAs to the scene of significant and/or major incidents?
TACAD’s are deployed where operationally appropriate.
Information on the number of qualified NILO’s and TACAD’s and those capable of on-call in the Scottish Ambulance Service is being withheld as it is considered to be sensitive and therefore exempt under Section 31 (1) national security and defence. Under Section 31(1), ‘information is exempt information if exemption from disclosure is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.’ Providing the detail requested would reveal potential vulnerabilities allowing these to be mapped for weakness. Providing the type of information requested and subsequent online publication, would very likely provide potential attackers with useful intelligence relating to the footprint of SAS and possible exposure through third parties, which is not in the public interest.
