FOI 26-188 Hybrid RRU Vehicles
Freedom of Information Request
- Reference
- FOI 26-188 Hybrid RRU Vehicles
- Request Date
- 13 Apr 2026
- Response Date
- 01 May 2026
- Information Requested
In addition to my previous request, I would be grateful if you could provide clarification on the assessment and governance arrangements relating to the current fleet of Hyundai Tucson Plug-in Hybrid Rapid Response Vehicles (RRV's), specifically in relation to driver assistance systems and operational suitability for emergency response driving. In particular, could you please confirm:
- Whether a formal risk assessment has been undertaken covering the use of driverassistancesystems (e.g. lane keeping assist, forward collision avoidance, speed warnings and audible alerts) during emergency response driving, including the potential for distraction, cognitive load, or unintended vehicle intervention.
- Whether any human factors or usability assessment has been conducted to understand the impact of these systems on staff undertaking emergency response driving.
- What evaluation has been maderegardingthe requirement to manually disable multiple systems at the start of every single mobilisation, and whether this has been considered from a safety and time-critical response perspective. In addition, it is understood that some functions (such as speed warning systems) cannot be fully disabled and may generate continuous audible alerts when exceeding posted speed limits. Please confirm whether the impact of persistent audible warnings on driver distraction and cognitive load during emergency response has been assessed.
- Whether the process of disconnecting and stowing charging cables prior to mobilisation has been risk assessed, particularly in relation to delayed departure and safe handling.
- What guidance, training, or standard operating procedures have been issued to staffregardingthe safe use or deactivation of these systems during emergency response driving.
- Whether any incidents, Inphase or Datix reports, or internal reviews haveidentifiedconcerns related to driver assistance system behaviour in RRV's.
- How the suitability of the Tucson PHEV platform for emergency response use was assessed at procurement stage, and whether alternative configurations (e.g. simplified or single-action system overrides) were considered.
Please also confirm whether these assessments were undertaken in partnership with staff-side representatives.
I would appreciate any documentation, summaries of assessments, or policy references that can be shared.
- Response
Q1 - We do not hold a formal recorded risk assessment specific to the use of driver assistance systems during emergency response driving in Hyundai Tucson Plug‑in Hybrid RRVs.
The recorded information we hold notes that the vehicle platform was assessed operationally by several drivers, including assignment of an evaluation vehicle to the Driver Training team to assess the vehicle in an emergency response specification. Following assessment, procurement of vehicles is and was presented to the National Vehicle Design & Equipment Group (NVDEG), where the Employee Director and Staff Side representatives from all recognised unions hold a standing invitation.
The recorded information we hold also notes that advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) are now widely adopted by vehicle manufacturers. The Scottish Ambulance Service seeks to procure safe vehicles for our staff, patients, the public and property and does not remove or disable vehicle‑based safety systems.
Q2 - We do not hold recorded information of a specific human factors or usability assessment undertaken to understand the impact of these systems on staff undertaking emergency response driving.
As set out in response to question 1, the recorded information we hold notes that the vehicle platform was assessed by the Driver Training team in an emergency response specification.
Q3 - We do not hold recorded information of an evaluation relating to manually disabling multiple systems at the start of every mobilisation, nor do we hold a recorded assessment of the impact of persistent audible warnings on driver distraction and cognitive load during emergency response driving.
This is because the Driver Training position is that vehicle and driver safety systems should not be disabled. On that basis, no assessment has been undertaken or recorded that considers routine deactivation of such safety systems, as this would conflict with the training approach.
Q4 - We do not hold a specific recorded risk assessment for disconnecting and stowing charging cables prior to mobilisation.
As with any vehicle use, the driver must ensure the vehicle is safe to travel before commencing any journey. The recorded information we hold notes that vehicles are designed to prevent movement when a charge cable is connected. Where a cable is connected, the time taken to unplug and stow the cable (where necessary) forms part of the normal departure process for that vehicle.
Q5 - The use of the vehicle is taught by the Education & Professional Development Department through Driver Training. The safe use of vehicle systems during emergency driving continues to form a key part of that training and has done so over many years as ADAS has been introduced on most vehicle types.
No training is provided in the deactivation of safety systems.
Q6 - We have undertaken searches of InPhase for the last 12 months for any vehicle layout issues relating to RRVs and did not identify any relevant reports.
The recorded information we hold indicates that the main vehicle layout concerns reported within that period relate to the layout of Ambulances rather than RRVs. Those ambulance layout concerns are being reviewed through the relevant governance arrangements and are reported to NVDEG.
Q7 - As set out in response to question 1, the recorded information we hold notes that the vehicle platform was assessed operationally by several drivers, including assignment of an evaluation vehicle to the Driver Training team, and that procurement is presented at NVDEG. The Employee Director and Staff Side representatives from all recognised unions hold a standing invitation to that group.
The recorded information we hold also confirms that the current installations and conversions are compliant with applicable requirements, including The Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations 1989 (and subsequent amendments), relevant Comité Européen de Normalisation (CEN) requirements, and British Standard BS EN 1789:2020+A1:2023 applicable to road ambulances and medical vehicles and their equipment.
We do not hold recorded information of a specific procurement‑stage assessment that considers alternative configurations such as simplified or single‑action system overrides. Accordingly, we provide notice under section 17(1) of FOISA.
